INTRODUCTION
Few issues in American criminal justice have proven more toxic to police/community relations than stop and frisk. To take just one example, federal judge Shira Scheindlin recently declared that stops lacking "individualized reasonable suspicion" had become so "pervasive and persistent" in New York City that they not only reflected "standard [police] procedure," but had become "a fact of daily life" for minority residents. 2 Scheindlin promptly ordered "immediate changes to the NYPD's policies," meanwhile recalling the Supreme Court's observation in Terry v. Ohio that "the degree of community resentment" caused by a particular police practice could influence judicial "assessment" of that practice. 3 Scheindlin's invocation of Terry as a curb on stop and frisk proved remarkable. According to most accounts, Terry marked a turning point in the Supreme Court's criminal procedure revolution, a move away from extending constitutional rights to minorities and towards granting increased discretion to police, through the sanctioning of stop and frisk.
Yet, Scheindlin's point evokes a different history, one that played out almost half a century ago on the streets of New York. At that time, Terry did not betray the Warren Court's revolution so much as compensate for tensions exacerbated by it, particularly issues triggered by Mapp v. Ohio; the landmark 1961 opinion extending the exclusionary rule to the states. 5 Praised for requiring that police procure detailed warrants before entering private homes, Mapp actually worsened interactions between police and minorities on the street, in part by encouraging police to develop creative means of stopping suspects; including techniques that involved intimidation and violence. 6 As news of such methods began to spread, the NYPD itself began to lobby for more formalized stop and frisk requirements, hoping to reduce the likelihood of police/minority conflict. 7 The Supreme Court's eventual approval of such requirements in Terry v. Ohio and a companion case styled Sibron v. New York, marked a standardization of police procedure that appeared to facilitate local policing, even as it bore larger, geographic implications. 8 No longer free ) (noting that the Court's procedure rulings were partly "triggered by the Supreme Court's growing appreciation of the position occupied by the 'underprivileged' of society -minority groups, the poor, and the young"); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment: History, Purpose, and Remedies, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (2010). 7 See infra §III. 8 The argument that the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions were ultimately a theatrical move to reduce police/minority tensions does not contradict the claim, made by Devon Carbado, that police/minority interactions constitute "racial theater." See, e.g. Devon Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 953 (2002) . On the contrary, this piece argues the Warren Court became very interested in improving to enter homes without warrants, police in New York intensified their focus on public spaces, pushing liberty indoors and setting the stage for the increased surveillance of the public sphere, a move that facilitated the apprehension and incarceration of black men. 9 While criminal law scholar Michelle Alexander has shown that stop and frisks "often serve as the gateway into the criminal justice system" for "young men of color," she occludes the complex forces that led to their rise. 10 This Article seeks to identify those forces, relating the rise of stop and frisk rules to liberal politics, Cold War concerns, and spatial dynamics. To illustrate, this article will proceed in three parts. Part I will demonstrate how Mapp v. Ohio coincided with judicial frustration at police intrusions into private, intimate space -including private thought -precisely at a time when the United States sought to distinguish itself from totalitarian "thought control" regimes during the Cold War. Part II will show how the Court's effort to prevent thought control and guard intimate space in Mapp engendered an unanticipated public effect, leading police both to lie about arrests and to use more violent means for procuring evidence from suspects on the street.
11
Finally, Part III will show how such street-level tensions played out at the local and national levels, interiorizing liberty in ways that allowed for a narrative of expanding freedoms midst a climate of increased police control. 12 Though scholars tend to cite 1968 as a turning point in Warren Court jurisprudence, a moment when liberal impulses on the Court succumbed to a conservative "counter-revolution," this article suggests a more fractured narrative -one in which liberal and conservative justices alike tolerated expansions of domestic liberty but moved increasingly, inadvertently, to heightening regulations of urban landscapes. 13 Here, the theatrical quality of such interactions, partly to reduce the likelihood that bystanders would react negatively to police searches and arrests. 9 133-34 (1988) . 15 The argument in this piece tracks criminal law scholar Bernard Harcourt's effort to "expose the real stakes" in the debate over police searches, arguing that improved police procedure plays a critical role in the maintenance of structural inequality. 19 Both scholars characterize the Court's concern for regulating police in terms that evoke intimate relationships, either between same sex couples or couples of the opposite sex, pairs that bear little in common with isolated individuals on the street.
Building on Suk and Sklansky, this article posits that the Court's interest in curtailing police stemmed less from an interest in ameliorating substantive inequality than expanding the scope of freedom in politically neutral, private spaces. Though remembered as a bid to help the poor, in other words, many of the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions actually did little to help the less affluent. 20 Black activists in New York argued precisely this point in the 1960s, questioning the Court's concern for the poor and agreeing with police that law enforcement's function vis a vis minorities had shifted from "[c]rime prevention" to "peace-keeping" a role aimed primarily at controlling urban landscapes.
21
According to black writer James Baldwin, the Court's campaign to soften police procedure sought primarily to contain black urban populations; or as he put it to "corral and control the ghetto." 22 In fact, from 1961 to 1968, New York City police and radical black leaders alike complained that the city was heightening the risk of urban violence by focusing on procedural/privacy matters, meanwhile ignoring structural causes of poverty and inequality. 23 Rather than level the playing field between rich and poor, in other words, the Warren Court's procedure rulings struck black activists and New York City cops alike as a type of theatre aimed at preserving inequality by holstering the truncheon, improving the management of the poor rather than fixing underlying socio-economic problems plaguing urban communities. AMERICAN CULTURE, 1965 -1975 (1992 . 24 Id. The use of theatre described in this piece aimed to obscure larger inequalities in American society, not to act as "a morality play for those involved in the nitty gritty of law enforcement," as Scott Sundby argues in That criminal procedure served a theatrical function in the 1960s coincides with the argument made by criminologist Peter K. Manning that much of modern policing hinges on image management, on maintaining "public support" for police by curtailing violence and engaging in a larger "drama of control." 25 According to Manning, this drama became particularly important in the United States as "the rise of large minority populations in urban areas and their exclusion from many opportunities changed the problems of urban social integration and crime into the more serious issue of politically managing a rising underclass demanding wider access to all forms of community service."
26 Though Manning focuses his inquiry on the rise of community policing in the 1980s, his analytic can be extended further, to the 1960s, and extended to include the federal judiciary. 27 During that time, this article posits, the drama of control became crucial not only to local police but also to the Supreme Court, who -as we shall see -moved aggressively to improve the image of urban police even as it constrained the protest powers of urban minorities, all part of a larger move to facilitate "managing a rising underclass." The Supreme Court referred repeatedly to thought control in the 1950s, always as a distinguishing characteristic of totalitarian regimes.
51
In 1950, for example, the Court made a point of refuting a charge of thought control against §9(h) of the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act, requiring Labor union officers to file an affidavit stating that they were not communist. 52 Similarly, in 1952, the Court rejected a charge that piping music into public streetcars constituted "thought control," though Justice Douglas warned of it in a dissent.
53 "[O]nce privacy is invaded," he declared, "privacy is gone," insinuating that even though playing government-sponsored music on streetcars might have been a harmless cultural program, "[i]t may be but a short step," he prophesied, "from a cultural program to a political program."
54 Though a passing assertion in an arguably inconsequential dissent, Douglas's mention of "political program[s]" in Public Utilities v. Pollak revealed the manner in which he viewed "the right of privacy" to be a "powerful deterrent to anyone who would control men's minds." Though comfortable with the idea that states could control obscenity, the Court rejected the idea that standards set for children should govern adults. 57 Four months later, the Court confronted the problem of obscenity again; this time in a case challenging the conviction of Samuel Roth, a bookseller convicted of publishing a magazine entitled American Aphrodite. 58 Here, the Court cabined what could be considered obscene, exempting works of literature and art thought to have critical merit, aimed at more than simply "appealing to the prurient interest." . 58 Del Dixon, ed., THE SUPREME COURT IN 61 Consequently, the FBI "mounted an all-out effort to discover the personal sexual habits of those under suspicion of subversive behavior," with a particular emphasis on "homosexuals."
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According to Nebraska Senator Kenneth Wherry, it was impossible to "separate homosexuals from subversives," a sentiment that led to an "obsession" with rooting out gays in government.
63 Also targeted were heterosexual officials living outside the "maturity" and "responsibility" of marriage, sparking a bizarrely Puritanical crusade to regulate both sexual proclivities and private thought. 64 Notions that sexual deviance threatened national security cut against the Supreme Court's tendency towards liberalizing erotic literature and freeing "men's minds," perhaps explaining why the Court avoided striking down Ohio's obscenity law in Mapp, preferring instead the less salacious path of invoking the exclusionary rule against the states. Even if the Court was not responding to Cold War sexual paranoia, the majority opinion in Mapp nevertheless framed the extension of the exclusionary rule to the states in decidedly intimate terms. According to Justice Clark, the police in question did not simply arrest Dollree Mapp for possessing pornographic literature; they "broke" into her home and proceeded to run "roughshod" over her. 68 In terms evoking sexual assault and even rape, Justice Clark recounted how one officer retrieved a sheet of paper from Mapp's "bosom," "grabbed her," "twisted her hand," and "forcibly" took her "upstairs to the bedroom," as she "yelled [and] pleaded with him" that "it was hurting."
69 Though the pornographic literature in question was ultimately found in the basement, Justice Clark focused his resuscitation of facts on the bedroom, noting how police searched "a dresser, a chest of drawers, a closet and some suitcases," even perusing "a photo album" belonging to the defendant. 70 According to criminal law scholar Jeannie Suk, judicial articulations of privacy in gendered terms -as attacks on the privacy of women -reflected a larger "anxiety" suffered by men "about intrusion" into male dominated private space. 71 This anxiety, argues Suk, stemmed in part from the traditional "nineteenth century bourgeois ideal" of the home as a man's castle -a place where a man's property, including his spouse, was protected from other men. 72 This anxiety also stemmed from a concern that men be free from "state intrusion" in matters sexual, including the right to "look at images of sex and naked women," a right the Court actually came to recognize in Stanley v. Georgia in 1969. 73 Though Mapp predated Stanley by eight years, the gendered tone of Clark's opinion, coupled with the pornography laden facts at issue in Mapp, suggest that preserving porn may in fact have been one of the inspirations for suddenly invoking the exclusionary rule; making it an early defense to sexual "thought control." 76 Yet, the precise manner in which Mapp aided racial minorities is not clear. 77 In fact, as the next section will show, initial signs that police procedure improved in the wake of Mapp quickly gave way to reports that the decision was pushing police to new levels of corruption in New York City, both in terms of how they procured evidence and how they treated minorities on the street. 78 Such declines, maintained Kuh, stemmed from the fact that officers felt uncertain as to whether they could lawfully search suspects who were not officially under arrest.
87
Even as arrests dropped, a more troubling phenomenon also emerged: police corruption appeared to increase. According to Kuh, during the year immediately following Mapp, police testimony became increasingly "improbable" as officers began to testify that upon seeing police, suspects simply "removed" objects from their pockets, "threw" them to the ground, and obviated the need for a search. 88 Similarly, police assigned to search private homes began to testify more frequently that they had been "invited" to search the homes of defendants, again precluding the need for a warrant. 89 Not only did Mapp reduce arrests, in other words, but it also encouraged police to stretch the truth, telling more elaborate "stories" to bolster the arrests they did make. In a study of almost 4,000 arrests, New York Legal Services corroborated Kuh's suspicions, providing hard data that police arrest narratives changed significantly in the aftermath of the ruling.
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For example, claims that suspects mysteriously "dropped" contraband upon sight of police rose significantly after the decision, particularly among uniformed officers who reported a 71.8 percent spike in such "dropsies" during the year immediately following Mapp. 92 Meanwhile, reports that police found contraband "hidden on the person" of suspects declined significantly at precisely the same time, indicating that police were suddenly cautious about admitting to searches. 93 An officer provided a clue into the brave new world of evidence recovery post-Mapp during an illegal search trial in New York City on September 12, 1962. 94 Charged with unlawfully searching a suspect, the officer claimed that he "frisked" suspects but did not conduct actual searches of them. 95 Pressed by a judge, the officer then demonstrated a standard frisk before the court, a relatively violent maneuver that aimed to shake evidence to the ground. 96 Rather than simply pat down the outside of the suspect's clothing, for example, the patrolman "grabbed" the suspect "and practically lifted him off his feet"; meanwhile shaking him to loosen any items that might be secreted in his pockets, waistband, or belt. 97 As a cigarette lighter and pair of eyeglasses "fell" to the floor, the manner in which a frisk might generate a drop suddenly became apparent, leaving open the question whether Mapp's prohibition on searches also applied to frisks, even forceful ones like the one demonstrated by the officer.
98
Even if officers decided against frisks, other means of procuring evidence from suspects on the street emerged post-Mapp.
99 In Cincinnati, for example, patrolmen "rush[ed]" suspects, "hoping to produce a panic" that would then lead them to "visibly discard" evidence. 100 Here too, the Court's application of the exclusionary rule had a counterintuitive effect; increasing the likelihood that police would engage in menacing behavior to get suspects to drop evidence.
101
Police efforts to induce dropped evidence indicate that rather than improve police conduct, Mapp may have only intensified the use of force, lying, and deception, pressing police to misrepresent how, precisely, they acquired evidence. 102 Of course, most dropsy cases did not involve the search of private homes, hence Mapp's success at garnering greater warrant requests. However, even Mapp's warrant data raised questions about the decision's ultimate effects. For example, New York Legal Services concluded that although police requested more warrants to search private rooms following Mapp, the actual location of arrests generally seemed to migrate out of private rooms and into public spaces following the decision. To illustrate, the location of most arrests prior to Mapp were streets (35%) and "unexplained rooms" (26%) meaning "rooms entered without explanation by the police."
103
Following the ruling, police reported lower numbers of arrests in unexplained rooms, dropping them from 26% to 17.6%, meanwhile increasing arrests in "hallways," "roof landings," and "basements." 104 What did this mean? Just as Mapp may have pressured officers to acquire warrants before entering homes, so too may the decision have refocused police attention on public space. 105 Rather than improve police professionalism, in other words, the decision simply transported police corruption, removing it from private homes to public areas (streets, 100 hallways, roof landings, and basements), where police could then shake down suspects for evidence. 106 This seemed a reasonable conclusion to New York Legal Services, who surmised that officers may have "stopped entering private rooms" and turned instead to spending "more time in the streets and halls." 107 Rather than "level the playing field" between rich and poor, in other words, Mapp simply provided more privacy to the already well-off, particularly those wealthy enough to live behind closed doors -either in spacious suburban homes or door-manned buildingswhere police were unlikely to prowl. 108 Conversely, poor residents of cramped apartments and public housing projects -the very people most in need of public space -suddenly found themselves the targets of intensified police searches, albeit in their halls, landings, and basements. 109 To what extent, if any, did the Supreme Court anticipate such an outcome? Rather than predict police corruption, the Court seemed convinced that Mapp would diminish it. "If the government becomes a lawbreaker," lectured the majority opinion, "it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
110 Rather than breed anarchy, the Court seemed to think it was restoring public confidence by reforming police behavior. "[N]othing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws," the Court concluded, implying that Mapp would ultimately pressure law enforcement to heightened, not lowered, lawfulness.
111
Not everyone agreed. Only a few months after Mapp was handed down, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission declared that better methods of improving police conduct existed than "those which provide sanctions after the fact," like the exclusionary rule. 112 To the Commission's mind, "preventive" measures promised to be more effective at regulating police 106 misconduct, including measures aimed at the "application of professional standards to the selection and training of policemen." 113 Such standards worked for "Federal police agents," asserted the report, and could be further augmented by "good pay, high recruit selection standards, and training in scientific crime detection, in human relations, and in police administration." 114 To encourage such reforms, the Commission recommended federal "grants-in-aid" to state and local governments, enabling them to develop "selection tests and standards," "training programs in constitutional rights and human relations," and "college-level schools of police administration." 115 While the Civil Rights Commission advocated improvements in police training, state and local courts struggled with the challenge of how, precisely, to interpret Mapp. "I cannot here even begin to develop all of the conflicting opinions that have been rendered by a variety of trial judges," lamented District Attorney Richard Kuh one year after the decision.
116 To take just a few examples, the Bronx County trial court or "Supreme Court" as it was called in New York, held in People v. Salerno that officers had probable cause to frisk a suspicious individual on the street based on the time of night he was sighted, the manner in which he was dressed, and the fact that he appeared to be carrying a weapon. 117 Meanwhile, the New York County Supreme Court held the opposite in People v. Rivera, a case where police stopped and "patted the outside" clothing of a suspect detected at 1:30 A.M. peering into the window of a bar and grill in a high crime neighborhood of Manhattan. 118 According to the Court, police officers were authorized to stop but not frisk such suspects prior to arrest.
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Not long thereafter, the New York Court of Appeals outraged police when it overturned a policy conviction in which officers had made repeated sightings of individuals handing money to a suspect on the street, 113 searched the suspect, and found a list of numbers and cash. 120 Though considered a "classic policy collector situation," Romie Moore's arrest struck the state's highest appellate court as unlawful, particularly since "mere evidence of persons handing money to another person does not prove a crime."
121 Not only did police find such an observation absurd, but the court failed to answer the question whether an officer could search a defendant even if he did not have "conclusive proof" that a crime was being committed. 122 By March of 1962, Governor Nelson Rockefeller joined police in declaring that "confusion" had become Mapp's primary contribution to the law of search and arrest. 123 To aid patrolmen on the street, Rockefeller endorsed a wave of measures aimed at improving working conditions, training, and pay for police, many of which echoed the Civil Rights Commission's recommendations of 1961. 124 To take just a few examples, the governor endorsed additional appropriations for state police so that they would not have to work more than forty hours a week. 125 Rockefeller also announced a fifty percent increase in the number of required training hours for police, going from eighty to one hundred twenty; and recommended uniform standards "of age, education, and physical and character qualifications," for all new recruits. 126 For older police officers who "who never had formal training" he endorsed the creation of courses that paralleled the "mandatory basic course" required of entry-level police.
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Despite Rockefeller's best hopes, police found calls for increased training to be on par with measures like the exclusionary rule, superficial checks that ignored the root causes of inequality. According to New York Police Commissioner Vincent Broderick, large percentages of New York's "Negro and Spanish-speaking" population were "being discriminated against in housing and forced to live in ghetto areas" 128 Addressing such structural issues, argued Broderick, was more important than correcting 120 superficial matters of training or procedure. 129 To his mind, the "devastating" poverty of the ghetto, including poor "education," "housing," and "employment," were "the pressing issue[s] of our time." 130 "Is it not time," declared Broderick on February 8, 1966, "for us to stand up and say that we intend to deal with substance and not with shadow?" 131 Only the "marshalling of all of the resources of the State and Federal Governments," continued Broderick, "could "help these, our fellow citizens." 132 In the absence of structural reform, police pushed for more limited gains; including a statute authorizing officers "to search and question a person" suspected of committing a crime "without making an arrest." 133 An early reference to stop and frisks, the measure gained endorsements from the Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials, a body made up of the State District Attorneys Association, the State Sheriffs Association, the Municipal Police Training Council and the State Association of Chiefs of Police. 134 All four agencies hoped to carve out exceptions to Mapp via state legislation, a point they made clear in a pamphlet entitled Let your Police -Police! arguing that Mapp had "rendered good police work meaningless and police experience worthless." 135 To illustrate, the pamphlet cited the facts in People v. Cassone, a case involving a police officer who noticed two men "lugging a heavy object" into the trunk of a car, only to find that it was a Western Union safe. 136 Unbelievably, the trial court held that the arrest was unlawful "because it was based on 'mere suspicion'" not probable cause. 137 To remedy such problems, the NYPD joined the Combined Council and endorsed four bills that would "correct certain inequities" in the law of criminal procedure. 138 Two of the four bills authorized officers to arrest suspects in cases where they had "reasonable grounds" for believing that a crime either was being committed or had just been completed. 139 The third facilitated "the execution of warrants" where property risked being destroyed and the fourth authorized police to "stop, temporarily detain, question and search a person for weapons" where there was "reasonable ground" to suspect a crime. 140 That the NYPD would push for a state law authorizing officers to stop and frisk suspects who appeared armed was not, on its face, a revolutionary move. The genesis of formalizing stop and frisks had emerged as early as 1939, when the Interstate Commission on Crime appointed a committee to draft a model code governing the law of arrest. 141 Prior to that point, a disorganized blend of common law and statute governed how police could handle suspicious persons on the street. 142 Often, this left officers confused about whether stops were technically arrests or not, leading some to avoid questioning suspicious individuals for fear of "a suit for false arrest." 143 At other times, police extended stops to the point that they became unregulated detentions, or "imprisonment ex communicado" a phenomenon that the Uniform Arrest Act sought to contain by placing a two hour limitation on the time that police could detain someone. 144 In addition to regulating stops, the Arrest Act also governed frisks, or searches, authorizing officers to search suspects if they had a reasonable fear that they were dangerous. 145 By holding that a law enforcement officer could search someone whenever he had "reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger," the Model Act settled one of the many questions raised by Mapp, namely whether officers could stop and search suspects without a warrant, and without having to lie and say that the suspect had dropped contraband. Rather than encourage corruption, in other words, the Act sought to reinforce "respect" for the law among police, meanwhile reducing the odds that suspects might feel "unjustly treated," and less willing to "cooperate." 146 To its backers, the "stop and frisk" law reinforced the emerging image of the police officer as a professional and an "expert," the very kind of individual that Governor Rockefeller sought to produce with higher standards, in-house training programs, and better hours. 147 Further, the Council promoted the statute as a much needed safety measure for police, not just a tool for better, more effective law enforcement. "Under present law," declared the Council, stopping and frisking a subject would not only amount to an unlawful arrest, but could even invite suspects to use "as much force as necessary" to stop the officer in question, even harming them. 148 Convinced that a stop and frisk law would improve police work conditions, the Combined Council also argued that it benefited those who were searched. Recognizing that police might arrest individuals who they would otherwise only stop and frisk, the Council noted that "[w]henever an innocent person is arrested, charged with a crime, and brought before a magistrate, his reputation is harmed, he is humiliated, greatly inconvenienced and put to considerable expense." 149 Better that suspects simply get patted down on the side-walk and set free.
Not everyone agreed. Black assemblymen objected to the stop and frisk legislation, arguing "that it would help create a 'police state' by subjecting the people of their districts to 'even greater abuse than they now suffer at the hands of police. '" 150 At the time, the "highest concentration" of arrests in New York occurred in predominantly black neighborhoods, most notably Harlem.
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Aware of such geographic concerns, black politicians argued that New York's stop and frisk law would "allow policemen to 'push around' citizens and permit them to operate as 'the Gestapo,'" precisely the type of totalitarianism that the Court had tried to address in Mapp. 152 Yet, the terrain had shifted. While Mapp created a zone of freedom within the home, it intensified police surveillance of the street, a move perfected by the normalization of stop and frisks. 153 As the next section demonstrates, support for stop and frisk only intensified as urban unrest grew, creating a stark disconnect between national narratives of expanding rights for criminal defendants and state sponsored policies of ghetto control.
III. "TO CORRAL AND CONTROL THE GHETTO"
Black complaints about New York's stop and frisk law underscored the complexity of police/minority relations in the city, a relationship that would only become more strained as the 1960s progressed. For example, in June 1963 racial unrest exploded when over 1,000 African Americans gathered to protest the arrest of a "Negro vendor of ices" in Harlem as officers "swinging nightsticks" quelled the crowd. 154 According to James Farmer, national director of the Congress of Racial Equality, or CORE, such violence threatened to "boil up in Harlems throughout the country" as black frustration over increased joblessness and "slum conditions" threatened "racial turmoil." 155 To avoid such turmoil, borough legislators met to "propose stronger laws curtailing job discrimination against Negroes and other minorities," prompting city leaders to acknowledge the challenge that structural inequalities posed to black life. 156 Yet, even as New York officials discoursed about long term goals like employment, housing, and education, so too did they recognize the short term necessity of keeping things calm. According to New York City Mayor Robert F. Wagner "[c]onstructive changes" were taking place "in both the North and the South," but this did not change the fact that police bore a particularly "difficult and delicate responsibility" to preserve "peace" and "order." 157 Precisely the kind of threat to order that Wagner alluded to emerged in New York in April 1963 when local chapters of CORE threatened to stall "hundreds of cars" on the highways leading to the World's Fair in Queens, including the Grand Central Parkway, the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway, the Long Island Expressway and the Van Wyck. 158 Not only did New York Mayor Robert Wagner declare such protest to be "illegal" but Attorney General Robert Kennedy declared it "irresponsible" and President Lyndon Johnson warned that the proposed demonstration risked "threats to safety," even "violence." 159 Though CORE backed down, discord reemerged on July 9, 1963, when civil rights activists initiated a sit-in on the steps of Manhattan's City Hall. 160 Initially, Wagner allowed the demonstrators to "conduct their sit-in without hindrance," declaring that he had "deep sympathy" for their effort to "focus public attention on the basic problem of civil rights." 161 However, the demonstrators quickly began to engage in activity that Wagner later characterized as "outright provocation," including "outbursts of shouting, chanting, and littering" that created "an unjustifiable interference with the orderly operations of Government at its very seat and center." 162 On August 22, violence between the demonstrators and police erupted, resulting in the injury of three officers. 163 Outraged, Mayor Wagner ordered the "immediate removal" of the protestors. 164 To his mind, the fight to maintain order in the face of what was quickly becoming a "social revolution" taxed police in ways that the fight against "crime and evil" did not.
165 Suddenly, law enforcement had to be versed not simply in "police tactics," but also in "civil rights," precisely so that they could better communicate with potential demonstrators, hopefully diffusing demonstrations without sparking violence.
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From this came a need for a "well-educated and professionally trained" force, one made up of what Wagner referred to as "professional soldiers." 167 That Wagner wished for professional police/soldiers versed in rights rhetoric underscored the manner in which police professionalism related to the successful management of political demonstrations and minority communities in New York. If police were better educated and better trained, Wagner implied, then they might be less prone to aggravating urban crowds, and less likely to incite riots -whether structural factors changed or not. 168 Dramatic evidence of the link between police and riots emerged in the summer of 1964, when violence broke out in New York after a white police officer shot a fifteen year old black male in Harlem. 169 During a demonstration protesting the boy's death, "[t]housands" of African Americans "raced through the center of Harlem, attacking white persons, pulling fire alarms and looting stores."
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Violence continued for three days, eventually spreading to the Bedford Stuyvesant neighborhood of Brooklyn where a "full scale riot" exploded after CORE "staged another rally to protest the shooting of the Negro youth."
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In an editorial commenting on the violence, black writer James Baldwin confirmed the relationship between police procedure and ghetto containment. "There is a very good reason for the Negroes to hate the police in Harlem," declared Baldwin, their "competence" was "abysmal" and "they know no other way of coping with the forces to which they are exposed" than to engage in "brutality." 172 Such brutality, continued Baldwin, formed a critical part of their efforts "to corral and control the citizens of the ghetto." 173 Baldwin's accusation that the NYPD sought primarily to "corral" the ghetto coincided eerily with the police's own complaints that judicial insistence on procedural reform simply obscured the unfair burden placed on police to maintain urban harmony, meanwhile ignoring the need for substantive political and economic change. 174 Here, a prominent black voice corroborated police complaints, underscoring procedure's role in preventing urban unrest.
That urban unrest threatened the nation became apparent to many during the early months of 1964 as metropolitan areas across the United States erupted in violence. 175 In Jackson, Mississippi, for example, "hundreds of [black] students threw, rocks, bricks and bottles," at "helmeted officers" after a white man struck a black coed with his automobile in February. 176 Meanwhile in Chicago, "angry blacks" set "fire" to a convenience store and proceeded to "rampage" for two nights after a white shopkeeper accused a black woman of "stealing a bottle of gin."
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In Atlanta, upwards of 300 black protestors engaged in a "brawling sidewalk demonstration" against "[t]en robed Ku Klux Klansmen" who had entered a downtown Krystal's restaurant. 178 Among the demonstrators was John Lewis, chairman of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, who allegedly "kicked and elbowed officers" as they placed him under arrest.
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The worst rioting stemmed directly from police action. Not only did violence explode in Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant after police shot a black teenager in July 1964, but rioting began north of the city in Rochester after "white police moved into a Negro neighborhood" to arrest a man "who had been creating a disturbance at a dance" that same month.
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Not long thereafter, rioting exploded for three consecutive nights in Paterson, New Jersey after police arrested "a Negro woman on a disorderly conduct charge."
181 Ninety miles south, in Philadelphia, the arrest of "a Negro woman whose car was blocking an intersection" led to "disorders" that lasted three nights in August as "[r]ioters broke store windows, looted shops, [and] hurled bricks from roofs at police."
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The alarming spike in black violence caught the attention not only of average Americans but international audiences. Soviet newspapers like Isvestiia and Pravda boasted headline coverage of American race riots, charging America for being a land of racial discrimination and political tyranny. 183 Similarly, "leaders of African nations denounced the United States" for its perceived treatment of racial minorities, transforming America's ghetto riots into a Cold War liability warranting quick, effective, state control.
184
Public embarrassment over riots spurred government officials across the country, including police, prosecutors, and judges to find ways of quelling the urban disorder. 185 In Philadelphia, for example, officials deliberately curtailed a local tradition, the annual Mummer's Parade, to minimize rioting. 186 Traditionally held on New Year's Day, the parade featured upwards of "15,000 mummers" belonging to thirty-one different marching clubs, including "22 string band units, four fancy groups in satin-covered floats and huge capes and five brigades of comics." 187 The comics, in a manner that would prove explosive in 1964, often performed "in blackface," a practice that roused white concern when city officials learned of "an active recruiting campaign being conducted in Harlem for persons to come here and protest." 188 Local CORE chairman Louis Smith warned that police should "look out for the rooftops because that is the way the people of New York operate," implying that outside demonstrators would come to Philadelphia from New York and hurl missiles down onto paraders. 189 Philadelphia's "400 Negro ministers" concurred, warning that "rioting along the route of the parade" was likely to occur. 190 To prevent violence, local ministers filed suit in city court, arguing for an injunction banning anyone in blackface from participating in the march. 191 During hearings before a three judge panel, police officials warned that "there might be 'physical violence'" unless blackface marchers were "barred" from the parade. 192 Though attorneys for the parade countered that "blackface" was "traditional" and that marchers "had no intention of belittling Negroes," the three judges presiding over the case decided that a real threat of violence existed, warranting an end to the city's blackface tradition. 193 As Philadelphia judges regulated Mummers, New York police focused on radical black leaders, among them William Epton, an activist arrested for conspiracy to riot and criminal anarchy in August 1964.
New York authorities showed little sympathy, positing that the black radical not only voiced interest in encouraging riots, but presented a clear and present danger to the state -a critical element in the charge of criminal anarchy. 197 Not invoked since the prosecution of Communist Benjamin Gitlow in 1920, criminal anarchy seemed a poor fit for Epton, who at best appeared to represent a radical fringe of city politics. 198 Yet, the very fact that Epton became the subject of criminal prosecution underscored at least two interconnected phenomena relating to criminal procedure and radical politics in New York at the time. 199 First, Epton's conviction for criminal anarchy not only invoked memories of the persecution of communists like Benjamin Gitlow in the 1920s, but pointed to persistent concerns with the kind of structural change that communists continued to endorse into the 1960s. Like Gitlow, for example, Epton also identified with the communist cause, serving as the "vice chairman" of Harlem's "Progressive Labor Movement," a "Maoist" organization boasting upwards of 1,200 members. 200 Though not a union leader, to be sure, Epton's concern with structural inequality paralleled police concerns with structural inequality; underscoring the fact that both police and advocates for the poor viewed procedural reforms simply as superficial salves to much deeper, structural wounds.
Not only did Epton's identification with radical labor point to police/poor parallels, but Epton's conviction itself suggested a contested relationship between the Supreme Court's criminal procedure rulings and civil rights. When . 201 Yet, the Court's zeal for such cases cooled in 1964 even as it blazed ahead with its regulation of police, indicating a disconnect between heightened social control and national narratives of expanding freedoms.
202
To illustrate, the Court's early interest in protesters' rights culminated in a series of rulings overturning the convictions of black demonstrators from 1961 to 1964. 203 Hoston, entered a Kress Department store in Baton Rouge on March 29, 1960 and proceeded to sit at a lunch counter reserved for whites. 204 When Hoston refused a request to leave, local police arrested her for disturbing the peace. 205 Though a relatively minor criminal charge, Hoston's breach of the peace conviction nevertheless made it to the United States Supreme Court, who found the case "barren of any evidence that would support a finding that the petitioners' conduct would even 'foreseeably' have disturbed the public."
206
The conclusion was dubious.
Sit-in demonstrations had in fact provoked violence and "fist fights between members of the two races" across the South, as the respondents argued in their brief, but the Court ignored such calamities in a bold statement of support for Hoston's protest. 207 The Court continued its support for protest from 1961 to 1964, deciding upwards of twenty cases in favor of black demonstrators. 208 In one of the last such cases, decided in 1964, the Court overturned another breach of the peace conviction, this time in Columbia, South Carolina. In a case styled Barr v. City of Columbia, the Court reviewed the arrest of "five Negro college students" for breach of the peace, holding that their sit-in demonstration had been "quiet," "peaceful," and unlikely "to move onlookers to commit acts of violence." 209 Though opposing counsel disagreed, arguing that the demonstration had been "quite tense," and that "everyone was on pins and needles … for fear that it could possibly lead to violence," the Court once again downplayed any relationship between demonstrations and unrest. 210 Barr was the last protest case to hit the Court before the Harlem, Rochester, and Patterson riots that summer. As pitched violence between urban blacks and white police intensified from June to August, the Court reevaluated its position on civil rights demonstrations generally, gradually moving against protesters in a batch of cases originating in the South, two of which involved protests in a church and one of which involved a demonstration in a school. 211 In both, the Court denied certiorari, leaving the convictions intact without a pronouncement of law.
212 Subsequent refusals to grant cert followed, coupled with articulations of concern about black demonstrators in cases like Cox v. Louisiana in 1965. There, the Court held that the exercise of free speech had to be tempered with the need for "maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy." 213 One year later, the Court upheld the conviction of thirty-two black college students who had gathered in protest at the Leon County jail in Tallahassee, Florida. 214 Though the students were charged with malicious trespass, a conviction the Court had overturned in earlier cases like Bouie v. City of Columbia and Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, Justice Black held that the demonstrators no longer possessed the right to protest "wherever they please," maintaining instead that local municipalities -"no less than a private owner of property" -retained the "power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." 215 Subsequent anti-protest rulings followed; some clearly upholding convictions that would, according to civil rights lawyer Jack Greenberg "have been reversed" under the Court's early, enthusiastic civil rights phase. 216 By the close of 1967, the Supreme Court had so tired of civil rights that it even upheld the conviction of black civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. for violating an injunction not to march in Birmingham, Alabama four years earlier, noting that "[t]his Court cannot hold that the petitioners were constitutionally free to ignore all the procedures of the law and carry their battle to the streets." 217 Forgetting that the "battle in the streets" in Birmingham had in fact been one of the movement's most significant victories, the Court sided instead with what King referred to as the "recalcitrant forces in the Deep South that will use the courts to perpetuate the unjust and illegal system of racial separation." 218 As the Court curtailed southern streets, so too did it constrict urban landscapes in the North. One year after upholding King's conviction, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of William Epton in New York, again for violating an injunction not to march. 219 Though Epton was ultimately charged with criminal anarchy, New York's corporation counsel Leo Larkin had also acquired a "temporary injunction" banning black protest. 220 As in Alabama, such injunctions proved a practical tool for containing black protest, one of the many "legal means" that New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller invoked "to maintain order in the state." 221 Though Epton and King differed in their rhetoric, King endorsing non-violence and Epton exhorting blacks to "smash" the state, both leaders fell victim to the same phenomenon: a growing consensus on the Court that black protest in public space needed to be contained. 222 One possible explanation for the Court's move against civil rights demonstrators just as the nation was celebrating civil rights gains may have been political. While early civil rights demonstrations in the American South curried national sympathy for the black plight, later protests in the North and West sent tendrils of fear through the nation, causing many to fear large-scale disorder and unrest. 223 As Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black put it in 1965, "the crowds that press in the streets for noble goals today can be supplanted tomorrow by street mobs pressuring the courts for precisely opposite ends."
224 Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Burke Marshall agreed, declaring that while it was "one thing" to demonstrate against unjust Jim Crow laws in the South, it was "another" to take the strategy of civil disobedience and apply it to the "complex and deep-rooted economic and social problems" plaguing minority communities in the urban north. 225 Such an approach, Marshall warned, risked spreading both disrespect for law and an ensuing "crisis in law enforcement." 226 Of course, New York police had long claimed that precisely such a crisis was brewing, only growing more deadly as structural causes of inequality went unaddressed. 227 However, the Court showed less interest in ameliorating structural inequality than it did in regulating face-to-face interactions on the street, both by sanctioning the use of injunctions against black demonstrators and, as urban unrest grew, continuing its campaign to reform police procedure. For example, just as the Court began to uphold the convictions of black demonstrators in the South, so too did it impose even more stringent requirements on how police handled criminal suspects in the North, including a requirement that officers alert defendants to their rights prior to questioning. 228 Though liberals celebrated this move, consecrated in a decision styled Miranda v. Arizona, few squared it with the Court's anti-protest cases, preferring instead to read the opinion as a victory for the poor. 229 However, the Court's demand that police inform suspects of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights promised little in the way of structural reform for poverty, sounding instead like an eerie parallel to calls for a "professional army" well-versed in rights rhetoric like the one endorsed by New York Mayor Robert Wagner in 1963. 230 To Wagner, a more rights-savvy police promised a solution to urban discord, not an end to poverty, a matter that the Supreme Court did not address directly in its Miranda opinion, though the implications were clear once read beside its protest rulings. For example, the Court's decisions in Adderley, Walker, and Epton all indicate that the nation's highest tribunal was becoming increasingly interested in corralling black anger, just as James Baldwin had warned in 1964. 231 Though Miranda provided no guarantee that criminal defendants would actually have their rights upheld, its part in a larger drama of control was even more subtle, particularly as police departments themselves took cosmetic measures to improve the appearance of police action. For example, the NYPD deliberately hired a black officer named Lloyd Sealy to head its Harlem precinct in 1964, a direct response to the riots there that summer. 232 community tensions," a point underscoring the link between post-Mapp policing and urban riots. 246 Though lamented by liberals, both Sibron and Terry continued efforts to normalize the streets in New York, marking the culmination of a much larger campaign to address urban inequality through strategies of riot-avoidance and containment. As we have seen, such strategies did not involve structural reforms to ameliorate poverty so much as procedural rules aimed at scripting police/minority conduct. Nor did such strategies impinge on the larger narrative of expanding rights that came with Mapp v. Ohio. In fact, one year after the Supreme Court handed down Terry, it revisited a fact scenario uncannily similar to the one in Mapp but ruled directly on the obscenity question, allowing individuals to possess obscene materials in their homes; further expanding freedoms germane to domestic space. 247 Even as urban minorities complained of heightened police surveillance on the street in other words, the Court continued to bolster a national narrative of expanding constitutional freedoms, albeit from within the private, interior confines of the home.
IV. CONCLUSION
Three months before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Terry v. Ohio, a commission appointed by President Lyndon Johnson to investigate the causes of urban riots in the United States issued a report, positing that the "abrasive" manner in which police handled ghetto residents posed a "a major -and explosive -source of grievance, tension, and disorder," in the United States. 248 Of particular concern to the Kerner Commission, as it was called, were the "tension-creating effects" of "stopand-frisk" searches, particularly those conducted at random with little eye to whether individuals were either armed or dangerous. 249 Though the report did not mention Mapp v. Ohio, it corroborated the findings of New York Legal Services who had claimed five years earlier that the Supreme Court's extension of the exclusionary rule to the states had worsened police conduct towards minorities. 250 Terry, ironically, corrected for this, restricting police to only frisking individuals suspected of being armed or engaged in criminal activity. of criminal procedure in the United States. 252 Instead, Terry tends to be framed as a turn against the civil rights focus of Mapp, a coda to the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution. 253 Yet, recovering Terry's role in correcting Mapp is important both for what it says about the exclusionary rule and for what it says about the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution generally. As this article has shown, the Court framed the exclusionary rule in Mapp in terms of intimate privacy rather than racial parity, a point that helps explain why the Court failed to anticipate its negative, urban effects. 254 Second, as this article has also sought to demonstrate, both police unions and black activists lamented the Court's move into procedure not as a liberal effort to help the poor so much as a deliberate attempt to sidestep the need for more extensive, structural reform. 255 Some, like black writer and activist James Baldwin even accused the Court of simply trying to "corral and control" the "ghetto." 256 Reframing the Court's criminal procedure revolution as an effort to control the ghetto, though at first glance cynical, actually helps to establish two important points. First, the Supreme Court's curtailment of police behavior in opinions like Mapp v. Ohio did not help criminal defendants evenly, proving much more useful to defendants in private houses than public spaces. 257 In fact, Mapp worsened police/minority conduct in such spaces, so much so that police themselves began to lobby for formalized stop and frisk rules. 258 As the Supreme Court reviewed such rules, so too did it interiorize liberty, thwarting police invasions of the home meanwhile sanctioning heightened police surveillance of the street. 259 While criminal law scholar Michelle Alexander has shown that stop and frisks contribute to the incarceration of minorities, she fails to account for the liberal/geographic forces that contributed to such a result. 260 Like many historians of criminal procedure, Alexander roots the rise of stop and frisk in a conservative backlash to the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution, a backlash that extended through the War on Drugs. 261 While this was certainly a factor, the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution contributed to incarceration as well, first in the privacy frame that inspired Mapp v. Ohio, and later in efforts to curb police malfeasance in urban landscapes. 262 That liberal reform joined conservative backlash in compartmentalizing liberty remains one of the least understood, but still important lessons to be learned from criminal procedure reform in the 1960s, a lesson demonstrating clearly how a narrative of expanding liberty could coincide with mass incarceration. 260 
